Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 56

Issue 2

Article 7

1967

Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility by
Donald G. Morgan
Robert M. Ireland
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Ireland, Robert M. (1967) "Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility by Donald G. Morgan,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 56: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol56/iss2/7

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

19681

BooK REVIEWS

CONGRESS AND TE CoNsTTuTON:

A STuDY OF

RESPONSIBLITY.

By

Donald G. Morgan. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 1966. Pp. 490. $8.95.
Students of American government have long ignored the part
Congress has played in the construction of the Constitution. Consequently many scholars, teachers, and Congressmen have assumed that
the Supreme Court has always exercised the exclusive right of constitutional interpretation, and the national legislature has traditionally
concerned itself only with matters of statutory policy. Such an assumption is erroneous, according to Professor Morgan, who asserts that
until recently Congress has been a leading instrument in the exposition of the Constitution.
Early in the nineteenth century three theories emerged concerning the proper relationship of Congress to the Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson developed the most complete theory, advocating
that Congress consider thoroughly the constitutional implications of
all legislative activities. Not surprisingly Jefferson minimized the role
of the Supreme Court in this process. He submitted that the national
legislature should not confine its deliberations to an analysis of
judicial holdings, but should also consult non-legal sources in determining the validity of proposed legislation. John Marshall had other ideas
about the proper role of Congress in the constitutional system. Although he recognized the need for Congress to consider the constitutionality of its legislative proposals, he understandably assigned a
higher value to judicial precedent. Joseph Story fashioned a third
theory. He implied strongly that Congress should leave the interpretation of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. Employing the prerogatives of a political scientist, Morgan brands the first two theories
as "tripartite," signifying participation by all three branches in the
making of constitutional decisions. He describes the latter doctrine as
that of "judicial monopolism," suggesting the dominant role of the
Supreme Court.
Morgan writes that during the ante-bellum period, Congress adhered largely to the Jeffersonian version of the tripartite theory. Congress handled constitutional questions with thoroughness and precision, relying on executive studies, recommendations from small committees, and the deliberations of the entire body sitting as a Committee of the Whole. Although there were occasional lapses of responsibility, Morgan submits that the national legislature generally
carried out its duty to support the Constitution.
During the Civil War, Congress began to change its attitude toward the Constitution. Instead of following the precepts of Jefferson,
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it began to narrow its deliberations to analyses of judicial decisions,
thus following the teachings of Marshall. Morgan suggests that the
initial cause of this shift was the predominance of Republican sentiment in Congress and the existence of emergency conditions which
made hasty legislative action more tempting. Despite this development,
the nation's legislators continued for the next seventy years to perform
crucial functions in the fashioning of constitutional doctrine. In particular, their deliberations preceding the passage of the Sherman Act
seemingly influenced the first important decision of the Supreme Court
interpreting the scope of federal power in the area of anti-trust
regulation.
Morgan finds that the next change in Congressional attitudes toward the Constitution occurred in the early stages of the New Deal.
Beginning in 1935, a substantial number of Congressmen began adhering to the doctrine of judicial monopolism. Since that time, much
of our most significant legislation has been enacted with but superficial attention given by Congress to the constitutionality of its
actions. In the opinion of the author, this abdication of responsibility
on the part of many lawmakers has abetted the rush to executive
centralization. Morgan finds this trend most distressing and concludes his book by proposing specific measures to revive Congressional responsibility. In effect, he issues a plea for Congress to return
to the days and principles of Jefferson and to consider the constitutionality of all legislation, relying on non-legal as well as legal
sources.
Although Morgan does attempt to summarize the entire period
from 1789 to 1965, his book is more of a selective case study than a
definitive treatment of the subject. He discusses in depth only thirteen
episodes involving Congress and the Constitution. Regrettably, he has
chosen eight of these thirteen from the post-1938 period, thereby
restricting the scope of the book even further. Had the author treated
the nineteenth century in greater detail, he might have somewhat
altered his interpretation. For example, one wonders if the early
Congresses were in fact persistent guardians of the Constitution. Congress does not appear to have exercised sufficient independent constitutional judgment when it hurriedly enacted the Embargo of 1807.
This omission is especially significant since it involved a Jeffersonian
program and a Jeffersonian Congress. Furthermore, one looks in vain
for any evidence of a message from the President, imploring Congress
to examine the vital constitutional questions involved in the proposal
to shut off all exports. Thus, seemingly, Thomas Jefferson violated his
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own standards and those of Morgan, who proposes that a responsible
Chief Executive must prompt Congress to do its constitutional duty.
Other inconsistencies appear in the text. In one sentence Morgan
implicitly criticizes the Supreme Court for being "ponderous" and
then in the next passage deprecates Congress for the hastiness of its
debates. Although Morgan continually castigates Congress for confining its constitutional deliberations to the inspection of judicial decisions, he praises a joint Senate committee for resolving a question of
executive privilege by resorting almost exclusively to a scrutiny of legal
precedent. Likewise, Morgan ignores political realities in his treatment of the regional response to Congressional duty. While it may be
that in recent times Congressmen from the South and Borderlands
have been the most diligent in the preservation of the Congressional
obligation to interpret the Constitution, it is also true that they have
had practical as well as theoretical reasons for doing so since they
have frequently been opposed to the substance of the legislation under
consideration. Morgan neglects to note that, when it served their
purpose, Southern Congressmen in the ante-bellum period were
capable of embracing judicial monopolism just as enthusiastically as
Northern Congressmen do today. This tendency is especially evident in
the report on the Missouri Question presented by William Lowndes,
which Morgan overlooks in his cursory survey of the nineteenth
century.
Despite these shortcomings, Morgan's book is a good one. He has
shed light on a critical aspect of our constitutional evolution. Most of
his scholarship, as far as it goes, is sound. Hopefully, this monograph
will provoke additional studies of the influence of Congress on constitutional interpretation, especially in the nineteenth century.
Robert M. Ireland
Assistant Professor of History
University of Kentucky

